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TORTS-

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE-PROSPECTIVE APPLICA-

Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held per
curiam that Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute is to be
applied only to causes of action arising on or after the statute's
effective date, and that the doctrine of contributory negligence continues to govern all causes of action in negligence which arose prior
to that date.

TION OF STATUTES-The

Costa v. Lair, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 363 A.2d 1313 (1976).
After a motorcycle-automobile accident on August 1, 1975, plaintiff Lawrence Costa filed an action in trespass in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County to recover for personal injuries.' The
action was filed on September 21, 1975. The defendant asserted the
defense of contributory negligence in answer to an interrogatory. On
July 8, 1976, the Pennsylvania legislature passed Act No. 152, replacing contributory negligence with comparative negligence as the
law in the Commonwealth.' The Act was to take effect on September 7, 1976. 3 Prior to trial, but subsequent to Act 152's passage, the
plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground
that Act 152 should apply retroactively.' As an alternative, should
the court decide not to apply Act 152 retroactively, the plaintiff
sought a declaratory decree that the common law of contributory
negligence be abrogated in light of the announced legislative policy
5
enacted in Act 152.
1.
2.

Costa v. Lair, No. G.D. 75-22000 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. Aug. 31, 1976).
The statute provides in part:
In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury
to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where
such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
3. Id.
4. Costa v. Lair, No. G.D. 75-22000, slip. op. at 1 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. Aug. 31, 1976).
The motion for a partial summary judgment was made pursuant to PA. R. Civ. P. 1035. Under
this rule, the court may not only consider the pleadings of the case but the answers to
interrogatories as well.
5. Costa v. Lair, No. G.D. 75-22000, slip. op. at 1 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. Aug. 31, 1976).
The motion for a declaratory judgment was made pursuant to the Supplementary Provision
Concerning Declaratory Judgments, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 853 (Purdon 1953).
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The common pleas court granted both the plaintiff's motions. It
ruled that the Pennsylvania General Assembly intended that Act
152 apply retroactively, and even if such intent were absent, the
doctrine of contributory negligence should be abrogated and be replaced by comparative negligence as to all pending but untried
cases.6
The lower court certified an interlocutory appeal to the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania seeking a decision on both the scope of Act
152's application and the propriety of abrogating the common law
of contributory negligence in Pennsylvania. 7 In a per curiam opinion, the superior court reversed, holding that Act 152 was to be
construed prospectively, applying only to causes of action arising on
or after its effective date of September 7, 1976.8 Contributory negligence would continue to be the law of the jurisdiction for all causes
of action in negligence arising prior to the Act's effective date.
The superior court based its ruling of prospective application on
two fundamental principles of statutory construction. The first,
embodied in FarmersNational Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks County
Real Estate Co., 9 is that unless the legislative intent to apply a
statute retroactively is clear and manifest, all statutes, except those
concerning procedure, must be prospectively construed; 10 an exception for nonprocedural statutes could be recognized only if the legislative expression was "so clear as to preclude all question as to the
intention of the legislature."'" This presumption was not only judicially recognized in Pennsylvania but codified by the state's legislature. 2 Since there was no provision within Act 152 to demonstrate
6. Costa v. Lair, No. G.D. 75-22000, slip. op. at 4-5, 7 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. Aug. 31, 1976).
7. Costa v. Lair, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 519 n.2, 363 A.2d 1313, 1314 n.2 (1976). The
interlocutory appeal was certified in accordance with the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.101-.501 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). The Act gives the appellate
court discretion to consider such an appeal on the merits. Id. § 211.501.
8. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. at 522, 363 A.2d at 1315.
9. 333 Pa. 390, 5 A.2d 94 (1939).
10. Id. at 393, 5 A.2d at 95. Farmers involved a request by a judgment creditor to retroactively apply a statute which provided that unrecorded deeds were no longer invalid against
judgment creditors of deeds that were executed prior to the date of the statute's enactment.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 351 (Purdon 1955). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to
apply the statute retroactively on the grounds that it would result in a denial of due process.
11. 333 Pa. at 393, 5 A.2d at 95. See also Sawdey Liquor License Case, 369 Pa. 19, 85 A.2d
28 (1951) (refusing to retroactively apply municipal zoning ordinance).
12. The section of the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act entitled "Presumption
against retroactive effect" reads in relevant part: "No statute shall be construed to be retroac-
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a clear and manifest intent of retroactivity, in the court's view, the
Act had to be applied prospectively. 3
The second principle relied on by the court, termed "axiomatic"
of the first, provides that only statutes which affect remedies, and
do not affect contract, vested, or substantive rights, or vary existing
obligations, may be given retroactive application. 4 Although
"remedial" legislation could be applied retroactively even in the
absence of explicit legislative expression to do so, 5 the court determined that Act 152 did not fall within this exception. It reasoned
that retroactive application of Act 152 would alter substantive
rights because it would create liability that did not exist under the
tort law as it existed at the time of the incident giving rise to the
cause of action.'" The right was substantive in nature because defendants relied on the post-accident availability of contributory negligence in calculating their legal liability. 7 It was therefore error to
apply Act 152 retroactively, and, since it was also "improper" for
the lower court to judicially abrogate contributory negligence notwithstanding the legislature's move to abolish it,I the common law
of contributory negligence continued to govern all negligence actions
which arose prior to September 7, 1976.
tive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly. 1 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1926 (Purdon 1972).
13. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. at 519-20, 363 A.2d at 1315.'
14. Id. at 520, 363 A.2d at 1314, citing Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 161 A.2d 150 (1960).
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, PA.. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § § 2082-2089
(Purdon 1967), which provides that a release of one tort-feasor is not a release of all, was held
in Fenner not to vary defendants' liability and was therefore retrospective in scope. The
supreme court reasoned that although prior to the enactment a release of one tort-feasor was
a release of all, the retroactive application of the statute was permissible as a procedural
change; it did not govern the substantive cause of action in negligence which in Fennerarose
prior to the statutory change. 399 Pa. at 642, 161 A.2d at 155.
15. See J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 41.04, 41.09, at 253,
281 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973) [hereinafter cited as SUTHERLAND].
16. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. at 521, 363 A.2d at 1315.
17. Id. The Costa court agreed with Joseph v. Lowery, 261 Or. 545, 495 P.2d 273 (1972),
where the Oregon Supreme Court determined that in the case of contributory negligence, the
reliance element arose after the accident, in the defendants' calculation of their legal responsibility in light of the law existing at the time of the accident. Such calculations, it was felt,
should not depend upon nor be affected by subsequent legislation. The court held that the
Oregon comparative negligence act would be void if retroactively applied since such a construction would disturb substantive rights; therefore the Act had to be given prospective
effect. 261 Or. at 551, 495 P.2d at 276.
18. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. at 522, 363 A.2d at 1315. The superior court rejected the lower
court's reasoning on this point in one sentence. See text accompanying notes 47-53 infra.
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An analysis of Costa reveals that the Pennsylvania Superior Court
viewed the case as purely one of statutory construction. Examining
Act 152 solely in terms of the Act's language and applying "rules"
of statutory construction, three factors support the court's view that
the Act should not be given retroactive application. First, Act 152
provides that a plaintiff's contributory negligence "shall not bar a
recovery."' 9 Statutes containing the word "shall" have been construed as expressing a legislative intent of prospective application."0
Second, the Act was to take effect 60 days after it was enacted into
law.' In a number of Pennsylvania cases the court has construed
statutes which were to take effect in the future as conclusively evidencing an intent to be prospective in application.22 Third, Act 152
does not on its face manifest an intent that it be applied retroac3 and the
tively; under the rule enunciated in Farmers1
presumption
against retroactive application codified into Pennsylvania law, the
Act should not operate retrospectively." Act 152 thus seems to present a clear case for prospective application, and, at least in the
context of rules of statutory construction, the superior court's prospective ruling seems warranted.2 5
Rules of statutory construction, however, are tools employed by
courts to ascertain legislative intent where that intent is ambiguous
or unexpressed, applied in order that a statute's purpose may be
fulfilled.2 1 Upon a showing of contrary intent within the statute,
19. See note 2 supra for the text of the Act.
20. E.g., Summers v. Skibs A/S Myken, 191 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 296 F.2d 548
(3d Cir. 1961) (construing Pennsylvania Nonresident Vessel Owner Act); Dewart v. Purdy,
29 Pa. 113 (1858) (construing Allotment of Lands in Partition Act).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
22. Commonwealth v. Collin, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 300, 335 A.2d 383 (1975); Commonwealth
v. Griffin, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 59, 149 A.2d 656 (1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 838 (1961).
Compare Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 962, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (1975), where the Washington Supreme Court felt that a future effective date was not determinative of how to apply
the Washington comparative negligence statute.
23. Farmers Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks County Real Estate Co., 333 Pa. 390, 5 A.2d
94 (1939). See notes 9-13 and accompanying text supra.
24. See note 12 supra.
25. Most jurisdictions have similarly construed their newly enacted comparative negligence statutes to be prospective in application. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
367-85 apps. A, B (1974) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ]. For a general discussion of the
variant judicial constructions of the scope of comparative negligence statutes see id. at 14546.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Balestra, 88 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1937) (construing an amendment to the Naturalization Act of 1934 as retroactive in application despite the basic presumption in favor of prospective construction of statutes).
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such rules do not mechanically control the construction process.21
The argument can be made that such a contrary intent or expression
appears in Act 152. Section 1 of the Act provides that comparative
negligence shall be applied "in all actions brought to recover damages for negligence."28 The Pennsylvania Statutory Construction
Act defines an "action" as "any proceeding within the courts of the
Commonwealth." 29 Reading this definition of "action" into Act 152,
the lower court in Costa felt that "actions brought" must logically
refer to the commencement of a legal proceeding, at least where an
injured plaintiff had already filed a cause of action and was awaiting
trial.'" Once that step in the legal process had occurred, a plaintiff
could avail himself of the comparative negligence rule..
Although the statute is susceptible of this meaning by virtue of
such an interpretation of "action brought," it appears equally tenable that the only meaning intended by the legislature was to identify
the type of civil action involved, that is, a negligence action.' Given
the basic statutory presumption against retrospective application,
the lower court's interpretation of Act 152 is not a compelling one,
and the contrary intent needed to overcome that presumption arguably is not present in the statute.
The more difficult analytical question facing the superior court in
Costa was whether Act 152 was remedial in nature, thus falling
27. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 15, § 45.05, at 15-16, where it is suggested that the true
function of interpretation and construction is to carry out the legislature's will, and no single
rule can give a certain answer to a particular interpretative problem.
28. See note 2 supra. The codification of the rule favoring prospective construction of
statutes is entitled "a presumption." See note 12 supra. The lower court treated the presumption as a rebuttable one which had in fact been overcome in the case of Act 152. Costa v.
Lair, No. G.D. 75-22000, slip. op. at 3-4 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. Aug. 31, 1976).
29. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1991 (Purdon 1972).
30. Costa v. Lair, No. G.D. 75-22000, slip. op. at 3 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. Aug. 31, 1976).
The lower court did not specifically refer to the statutory definition of "action" but felt that
a strict construction of that word required that action be interpreted to mean the filing of a
suit. In order to avoid absurd results, the court of common pleas extended the Act's scope to
encompass claims filed prior to Act 152's effective date but still pending trial. Because of
third-party actions and counterclaims, a single tortious act could result in several claims
being filed at different times; if Act 152 were restricted to actions filed as of September 7,
1976, these later claims would be governed by comparative negligence while the original
negligence claim would be governed by contributory negligence. Id. at 4.
31. See Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Costa v. Lair, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 363 A.2d 1313
(1976). The defendant emphasized this point by citing Winfree v. Northern Pac. R.R., 227
U.S. 296 (1913), where the Federal Employer's Liability Act, which included language similar
to Act 152, was prospectively applied. The viability of Winfree has been questioned.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 148.
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within the general rule of giving remedial legislation retroactive
effect.32 Traditionally, prospective construction of legislation is justified on the premise that a person should be able to act with reasonable certainty upon the continued enforcement of existing substantive law. 3 However, a statute is deemed remedial or curative, and
thus amenable to retroactive application, when a court finds that
the statute does not affect preexisting substantive rights. The superior court's determination that substantive rights might be affected
by retroactive application of Act 152 since persons may have relied
on the doctrine of contributory negligence is not entirely persuasive.
The Costa court reasoned that retroactive application of the Act
would alter the legal character of past actions, since under contributory negligence the plaintiff's conduct was considered the legal
cause of his injury. 34 The retroactive application of comparative
negligence, it concluded, would modify substantive rights by holding both the plaintiff's and the defendant's conduct as legal causes
of the harm unless the plaintiff's causal negligence was greater than
the defendant's.3 1 In Barnesboro Borough v. Speice,31 cited by the
Costa court as supportive of this argument, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to apply a statute retroactively since it would
attach personal liability on landowners for assessed municipal improvements. The Barnesbororationale was that retroactive application of the statute would be unfair and would defeat the reasonable
expectations of heirs who would become titleholders to land as32. See, e.g., Pope v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 176 Pa.
Super. Ct. 276, 107 A.2d 191 (1954) (although statutes normally construed to operate prospectively only, remedial statutes may be applied to pending litigation); In re Malick, 137 Pa.
Super. Ct. 139, 8 A.2d 494 (1939) (rule against retroactive construction absent a clear intent
has no application to statutes deemed remedial).
33. See, e.g., Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hochman], where the author
suggests six reasons for prospective operation of legislation, emphasizing reliance on existing
law as the fundamental reason. Id. at 692-93.
34. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. at 520, 363 A.2d at 1315.
35. Pennsylvania's Act 152 is an enactment of a "modified" form of comparative negligence in that the percentage of the plaintiff's and defendant's negligence will only be compared to the point where they are equal. As long as the plaintiffs negligence is less than 50%,
he can recover from the defendant; if it is beyond 50%, he cannot. With the "pure" form of
comparative negligence, recovery may be had by the plaintiff for whatever percentage of his
injuries are attributable to the defendant's negligence. If the plaintiff is 90% at fault and the
defendant is 10% at fault, the plaintiff can recover 10% of his damages. For an example of a
comparative negligence statute of this type see note 46 infra.
36. 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 609 (1909).
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sessed under the old statute." The court concluded that the statute
was more than simply remedial and therefore could not be retroactively applied."8
A similar result does not necessarily follow from a retroactive
application of Act 152. Contributory negligence has been almost
universally viewed as inconsistent with the tort policy of liability
based on fault. 9 The purpose of comparative negligence as enacted
by the Pennsylvania legislature was to remove the unfair and inequitable results of the complete bar to recovery imposed by contributory negligence. 40 Whereas the principal concern of the
Barnesboro court was unfairness to those most affected by a new
statute, that consideration is attenuated in Costa since the very
purpose of the statute was to relieve an unfair situation. Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain any potential frustration of reliance
caused by retroactive application of Act 152."' As the superior court
in Costa conceded, any relevant element of reliance would not come
37. In Barnesboro, attaching a lien against the land -was the only remedy available to the
municipality prior to the law's passage. The court concluded that retroactive construction
"would violate principles too well established to be disregarded," and the practical effect of
such a construction would be an empty title with personal liability as an inheritance. Id. at
614.
38. Id. at 613.
39. See note 54 infra.
40. See PA. LEGIS. J., 160th Sess. 1705-06 (1976) (Senate). One of the legislators stated
that the doctrine of contributory negligence, which precludes recovery by a plaintiff if he is
negligent even to the smallest degree,
is inherently wrong and inconsistent with logic and ethics and equity. I would suggest
that it is long overdue for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to enter into the realities
of the doctrine of comparative negligence where the jury, in whom we all equally
believe, goes in and deliberates, calling on its resources to ascertain a percentage from
all the evidence and facts it had in the case, the percentage between the parties as to
who was wrong and to what degree.
Id. (Remarks of Senator Kelley on the Hill Amendments to Pa. Senate Bill 1237, Printer's
No. 1482 (Dec. 9, 1975)). The Hill Amendments were concerned with the percentage of
negligence necessary to preclude a plaintiff's recovery, as well as special verdicts by the jury.
The Hill Amendments were defeated by a 30 to 15 vote and Pa. Senate Bill 1237, Printer's
No. 1482 (Dec. 9, 1975), identical to Act 152, passed by a voice vote.
41. See Juenger, Brief for Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michiganin Support
of Comparative Negligence as Amicus Curiae, Parsonson v. Construction Equipment
Company, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 3 (1972). Although the arguments advanced by Juenger advocate
judicial abrogation of contributory negligence, they are apposite in the context of legislative
adoption of comparative negligence. He observed: "No major policy is at stake. Comparative
negligence . . . better accords with the principle that everyone is held accountable for his
fault.. . . No fundamental values are put in doubt; no new cause of actions are created; no
defenses erased." Id. at 42.
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into play until after the accident, when the defendant was charged
with negligent conduct.2 Such reliance may not warrant judicial
protection since it does not affect the conduct which occasioned the
incident; 3 aside from compensating individuals, it is this initial
conduct with which tort law is most concerned. In light of this
analysis, and the cogent arguments attacking the inequities of contributory negligence which the Pennsylvania legislature apparently
accepted, it would arguably be appropriate to give Act 152 a remedial and therefore retroactive construction falling within the exception to prospective application of statutes.44 Another jurisdiction has
found this "remedial" characterization persuasive. In Godfrey v.
State,4" the Washington Supreme Court construed that state's comparative negligence statute as intended to be applied retroactively
on the theory that it was remedial in nature.4 6 The Godfrey court
42. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. at 521, 363 A.2d at 1315. But see Peck, The Role of the Courts and
Legislature in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 306-07 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Peck], where the author suggests that the change from contributory negligence to comparative negligence is appropriately made by the judiciary because, among other reasons, the
interference with reasonable reliance occasioned by the change is insignificant. Peck's conclusion is that the insurance industry is the only group that calculates liability before the
incident, and further, premiums are unaffected by adoption of a comparative negligence
statute because although more plaintiffs recover under such a system, this is balanced by a
general reduction in the size of recovery. Id. See also Rosenburg, ComparativeNegligence in
Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV. & BAR ASS'N J. 89, 108 (1959), where
the suggestion is made that the effect of reduced verdicts under comparative negligence
refutes the argument that the contributory negligence doctrine is necessary to control juries
which are plaintiff-oriented. Compare with Rosenburg's conclusion Brief for the City of Pittsburgh as Amicus Curiae at 3, Costa v. Lair, 241 Pa. Super Ct. 517, 363 A.2d 1313 (1976), where
the city, as a self-insurer, speculated that the fixed budget sums allocated to cover liability
for accidents and injuries would be inadequate if the negligence law were changed, but offered
no concrete evidence to support its assertion.
43. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 15, § 41.02, at 248; Peck, supra note 42.
44. See note 32 supra.
45. 84 Wash. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975).
46. Id. at 960, 530 P.2d at 631. The pertinent portion of the statute reads:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by a person or his legal
representative to recover damages caused by negligence resulting in death or injury to
person or property, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the
percentage of negligence attributable to the party recovering.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (1974). Washington's comparative negligence statute is similar
to Act 152 except that Washington has enacted the "pure" form of comparative negligence
and Pennsylvania has adopted the "modified" form. See notes 2 & 35 supra. The Washington
Supreme Court in Godfrey distinguished recovery from liability, stating: "[The statute] does
not change liability for the consequences of negligence. It only substitutes a concept of partial
recovery for the common law total bar to recovery. In so doing, the legislature has provided a
more complete, workable and effective remedy that is retroactive in effect." 84 Wash. 2d at
962, 530 P.2d at 633 (emphasis added).
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recognized that characterizing a comparative negligence statute as
remedial fosters the legislative purpose without defeating reasonable reliance upon existing law.
In addition to its disposition of the retroactivity issue, the Costa
court's summary rejection of the common pleas court's holding that
it could abrogate a common law doctrine in view of the newly expressed legislative policy is significant, for it may represent a restrictive view by the superior court of the constraint stare decisis
places on it and Pennsylvania trial courts. Lower courts are, of
course, bound to apply the common law as articulated by the state's
highest court.47 The superior court might have viewed the common
pleas court as having no choice but to apply contributory negligence. Yet there is merit in the lower court's argument that it was
dealing with a case of first impression. Comparative negligence had
never previously been accepted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court,4" nor had the court ever considered whether it should judicially abrogate the common law doctrine of contributory negligence
in the face of a state statute establishing comparative negligence as
the law of the jurisdiction.
Stare decisis, based upon principles of certainty and stability in
the law, 9 binds a lower court to the decisions of the higher court in
the state. If stare decisis were the only relevant consideration in
Costa, authority strongly supports the Costa court's determination
47. It appears that the superior court has only once expressly overruled a supreme court
precedent. See Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 252, 164 A.2d 113 (1960). The precedent
overruled in Manley, that the defense of insanity was unavailable to a wife in a divorce
proceeding, was 113 years old, was thought unreasonable and unjust, and apparently had not
been referred to by the supreme court since its announcement. These factors, reasoned the
superior court, permitted it to ignore the rule of stare decisis. Id. at 263-64, 164 A.2d at 11920.
48. The rule of contributory negligence was settled law in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Cebulskie v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 441 Pa. 230, 272 A.2d 171 (1971); Weir v. Haverford Elec. Light
Co., 221 Pa. 611, 70 A. 874 (1908). In Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a compromise verdict, if the amount were substantial, would be upheld where the evidence of negligence or contributory negligence, or
both, was conflicting or not free from doubt. The court found it necessary to restate that
Pennsylvania does not recognize comparative negligence. See note 57 infra. In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Musmanno questioned whether the practical effect of the holding was
not a "spasmodic" adoption and application of comparative negligence. 382 Pa. at 238, 114
A.2d at 156 (dissenting opinion). Curiously, neither the dissenter nor the majority analyzed
the rationale or policy behind comparative or contributory negligence, nor indicated a preference for either of the two doctrines.
49. See Kelman, The Force of Precedent in the Lower Courts, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 3 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Kelman].
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that the court of common pleas, and in turn the superior court, did
not have the prerogative to overturn supreme court precedent reaffirming the viability of contributory negligence in Pennsylvania. °
One of the primary functions of a trial court, however, is to creatively analyze precedent with regard to the case before it in order
to determine if that precedent appropriately governs the resolution
of the case. 5 The superior court apparently did not feel that it was
proper for a court to reason from announced legislative policy,
thereby ignoring settled judicial decisions. Yet such a process of
reasoning not only has been acknowledged by many authorities, 5 it
has also been employed by the United States Supreme Court.53 The
superior court's position may presuppose that while it may be proper for the highest court of a state to overrule its own prior decisions
by reasoning from legislative policy, it is beyond the purview of a
trial court to similarly abrogate precedent from the state's highest
court. This position, however, would compel a lower court to ignore
a statute and its salutory purposes in a situation where the precedent is void of justification. 4 It seems more reasonable to conclude
50. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
51. See Kelman, supra note 49, at 4-5, 28, where the author summarizes the three primary
functions of a trial court as being: (1) to follow precedent absolutely; (2) to discern whether
the precedent is still viable, since many decisions are overruled implicitly by the higher court;
and (3) to creatively analyze the particular precedent and decide if it is determinative in the
resolution of the instant case.
52. E.g., Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908); Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 13 (1936); J. Landis, Statutes and
the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYs 213, 226-27 (1934).
53. See Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). The issue in Moragne
was whether the ruling in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), that maritime law provides
no cause of action for wrongful death within a state's territorial waters, was still acceptable
law. The Court noted that the rule had been adopted from English law and was without
apparent vindication except for its age. The Court determined that even if there were justification for the rule at its adoption, it was significantly out of line with the major policies
developed in modern maritime law. Furthermore, congressional legislation unanimously favored a policy of recovery for wrongful death beyond the particulars of each specific statute.
Id. at 388-90. See Brief for Appellee at 38-41, Costa v. Lair, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 363 A.2d
1313 (1976), where appellee advanced this argument.
54. Perhaps nowhere is this possibility more apparent than in the area of contributory
negligence. Dean Prosser once remarked: "No one ever has succeeded in justifying
[contributory negligence] as a policy, and no one ever will." Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 469 (1953). See also Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (all or nothing doctrine of contributory negligence inequitable and inconsistent with liability based on fault); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.
2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (doctrine unjust and inequitable because entire loss is on one party despite
fact fault was shared); Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REv.
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that a trial court must look at the case before it when dealing with
new legislation, ascertain the facts involved including the announced legislative policy, and determine if the case is still bound
by stare decisis or may be decided free from any such constraint.
Certainly the superior court's decision would have been more satisfactory had it addressed the merits of the lower court's position
rather than simply dismissing it as "improper."
Act 152 was passed to remedy a perceived injustice in Pennsylvania common law: the Pennsylvania General Assembly seems to
have accepted the view that to completely deny recovery to an injured but slightly negligent plaintiff is inherently inequitable. To
this extent, the Act is truly remedial. The Costa court's rejection of
that view, and its consequent refusal to apply Act 152 retroactively,
may have considerable impact. The superior court's ruling has prevailed on appeal,55 and for as long as six years,56 Pennsylvania courts
will be employing two different sets of rules in cases where a plaintiff's negligence is at issue-comparative negligence where the negligence occurred after September 7, 1976, and contributory negligence
in instances where the negligent acts occurred prior to that date.
This situation will only foster confusion, and possibly encourage
sympathetic juries to implement their own system of comparative
negligence in the form of compromise verdicts.57 It is doubtful that
463, 508-09 (1962). But cf. Kalven, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparativev. Contributorv Negligence: Should the Court or LegislatureDecide?, 21 VAND. L. REv. 889, 901 (1968),
where the author argues that there is no intelligent way to compare the negligence of both
parties, and there is a somewhat rough equity under contributory negligence since neither
party can recover his damages from the other.
As of 1976, 29 states, as well as Puerto Rico, have adopted some form of comparative
negligence. Three of these, Alaska, Florida, and California, have judicially adopted the doctrine without legislative assistance. See Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Nga Li
v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
55. Costa v. Lair, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 363 A.2d 1313 (1976). The petition for allocatur
was denied on March 15, 1977.
56. For example, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (Purdon 1953), provides a six-year statute
of limitations on negligence actions in cases involving property damage. The duration of a
dual system of recovery in negligence litigation might be even longer in those courts with a
backlog of cases.
57. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court once observed:
The doctrine of comparative negligence, or degrees of negligence, is not recognized by
the Courts of Pennsyvania, but as a practical matter they are frequently taken into
consideration by a jury. The net result, as every trial judge knows, is that in a large
majority of negligence cases where the evidence of negligence is not clear, or where the
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the Pennsylvania lawmakers who enacted Act 152 intended such a
result.
Linda J. McClellan
question of contributory negligence is not free from doubt, the jury brings in a compromise verdict.
Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 234, 114 A.2d 150, 154 (1955). In a concurring opinion, Justice
Jones termed this compromise verdict by the jury "nothing other than the indulgence of
caprice." Id. at 238, 114 A.2d at 156.

